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Value capture in global production networks: evidence
from the Taiwanese electronics industry
Namchul Shin,a∗ Kenneth L. Kraemerb and Jason Dedrickc
aSeidenberg School of Computer Science and Information Systems, Pace University, New York, NY,
United States; bThe Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, CA, United
States; cSchool of Information Studies, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States
In today’s global electronics industry, lead firms and suppliers of key components
capture greater value than contract manufacturers. Using data from the Taiwanese
Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2009, this research aims to examine if the pattern of value
capture in the global electronics industry holds for Taiwan. We also test the impacts of
research and development (R&D) spending on firm profitability and returns. Our results
show that lead firms and component suppliers capture higher gross profits from their
R&D spending, compared to contract manufacturers. However, contract manufacturers
have higher return on equity. Component suppliers’ return to R&D as measured by
return on equity is lower than contract manufacturers. These findings suggest that
component suppliers capture higher profits as lead firms do, but the cost of R&D for
component suppliers is so high that their returns on investment are not as great as
contract manufacturers. This also suggests that Taiwanese component suppliers are
unable to create entry barriers or gain pricing power from their R&D investments.
Keywords: value capture; global production networks; Taiwan; electronics industry
1. Introduction
As value chains in the electronics industry are disintegrated across corporate and national
boundaries, lead companies (brand name firms) work closely with global suppliers of com-
ponents and contract manufacturers (CMs) to bring new products tomarket. In such a global
industry, lead firms and component suppliers, particularly suppliers of key components,
have been shown to capture greater value than CMs. They build up high entry barriers by
deploying and integrating such resources as marketing, branding and intellectual property
(Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009; Shin, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2012).
This research examines if the pattern of value capture in the global electronics industry
holds for an emerging economy, Taiwan, by employing data from the Taiwanese Stock
Exchange from 2002 to 2009. We choose Taiwan as our research setting for two reasons:
First, Taiwanese electronics firms play a major role in global value chains of the electronics
industry (Einhorn 2005). Taiwanese electronics firms are the largest producers in the global
market of desktop PCs, notebooks, displays and motherboards (Dedrick and Kraemer
2005). They also manufacture many consumer electronics products, including the entire
line of iPods, iPhones and iPads. Taiwanese electronics firms have developed their own
regional production network, the so-called Sino-Taiwanese production network by shifting
production to mainland China (Yang 2006).
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Second, Taiwanese firms have been concentrated in the low-margin assembly business.
It has been the goal of many of those firms to escape this position by moving either
by upstream or downstream in the value chain. In fact, it was Acer founder Stan Shih
(1996) who created the ‘smiling curve’ concept that predicts the lower profitability of
assemblers in the middle of the value chain. Taiwanese firms, such as Acer and Asustek,
have tried to improve their competitive position in global value chains by spinning off their
contract manufacturing business as separate companies (Wistron and Pegatron Technology,
respectively) and are concentrating their own efforts on developing the brand name business.
Smart phone CM HTC has developed its own line of successful brand name phones. Other
assemblers, such as Quanta and Compal, have long tried to capture more value by bundling
design with manufacturing services (these are referred to as original design manufacturers
(ODMs)), while some, such as Quanta and Hon Hai (Foxconn), produce components as
well as providing manufacturing services.
What is not known is whether Taiwanese firms are able to achieve superior performance
by focusing on component or brand namemarkets, especially given the high cost of research
& development (R&D) and brand building required by those industry segments. Existing
studies (e.g. Shin, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2012) have focused on global companies, mostly
located in the major markets and technology centers of the US, Europe and Japan. The
purpose of this research is to analyze the profitability of Taiwanese electronics companies
and compare lead firms, component suppliers and CMs.We study both overall performance
and the performance relative to R&D investment.
The key questions we raise for this research are as follows: Do these lead firms capture
greater value compared with component suppliers and CMs when multiple performance
measures, such as gross profit, return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), are
used? In what ways are they similar to or different from the general pattern in the global
electronics industry? Do lead firms earn greater returns from their R&D investments than
component suppliers andCMs? To answer these questions, we frame our analysis in terms of
whether R&D expenditures build up entry barriers, which enable some firms (lead firms or
component suppliers) to capture greater value. In the next section, we review theories related
to barriers to entry and propose hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research methods and
data sources. We present our results in Section 4. Discussion and conclusions are provided
in Section 5.
2. Theoretical background
A company gains profits from a distinctive and unique position in an industry (Porter 1996).
However, such a strategic position can attract imitation and be replicated by competitors
because information about the firm’s position, e.g. technological, social, economic, regula-
tory and market forces, is openly available for other firms in the same environment (Barney
1986; Makadok 1999). However, the information about the resources a firm owns is not
readily available to other firms. If the firm implements its strategy by using these resources,
and if similar resources are not owned by competing firms, then they can confer large profits
(Barney 1986).
In competitive markets, dynamic capabilities can create entry barriers and lead to sus-
tained firm profitability by enabling innovation, asset orchestration, resource combinations
and reconfiguration (Teece 2007). The resources and dynamic capabilities incumbent firms
possess are difficult for competitors to acquire; they are mostly intangibles, which are hard
to imitate and immobile (Grant 1991; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993).
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In the value chains, lead firms can capture higher profits by creating entry barriers
through branding, customer loyalty and knowledge of the whole product system. They
focus on product-level innovation by identifying new product markets and integrating
new technologies developed by upstream suppliers, thereby obtaining more value from
R&D. Component suppliers also can create entry barriers by focusing on component-level
innovation and controlling key technology standards. On the other hand, assembly firms
capture lower margins due to lower switching costs and lack of market power. Lead firms
constantly switch (or threaten to switch) business among them, from one product to another,
keeping them intensely competing with each other. Assembly firms also have little pricing
power because they have few capabilities that cannot be replicated by competitors, and they
may not have the financial resources to absorb the shock of losing a major customer. If they
do invest in R&D, they are not in a position to capture value from innovation by locking in
customers or creating barriers to entry.
Thus, we argue that in the Taiwanese electronics industry, lead firms and component
suppliers have resources that may enable them to build up barriers to entry and capture
greater value than CMs (or original design manufacturers). These theoretical arguments,
supported by evidence from the global electronics industry, lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Lead firms and component suppliers capture higher value, as measured by
standard financial measures, than CMs/ODMs.
Hypothesis 2: Lead firms and component suppliers capture higher value from R&D than
CMs/ODMs.
3. Research methods
To compare the performance of lead firms, component suppliers and CMs/ODMs, we
employ the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure, the nonparametric χ2 and
median tests. We also examine whether lead firms and component suppliers capture more
value fromR&D thanCMs/ODMs by conducting two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression
analysis. We conduct two separate analyses of performance for lead firms and component
suppliers, with R&D spending, a ‘lead firm’ (or ‘component supplier’) dummy variable,
an interaction term of R&D spending and the lead firm (or component supplier) dummy
variable and industry and year control variables. The interaction term examines if lead
firms (or component suppliers) capture higher value from R&D spending, compared to
CMs/ODMs.
The 2SLS is employed to account for the possibility of endogeneity that may influence
the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variable. Although R&D
spending may improve firm performance, the opposite may also be true; firms may spend
more on R&D with increased revenue or profits. This reverse causality may result in the
correlation of the independent variable with the error term, which may lead to inconsistent
ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation.We employ a set of instrument variables to address
the issue of reverse causality, such as one-year lagged R&D, four-firm concentration ratio
(CR4) and industry average R&D ratio. As performance measures, we employ profitability
measures, including gross margin, net margin, ROA and ROE.
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3.1. The model
Our regression model measures performance of lead firm (or component supplier) and
CMs/ODMs in the Taiwanese electronics industry, while controlling for firm size, region-
and year-specific effects. We employ two separate models to estimate the main effects of
R&D spending and being a lead firm (or component supplier) and the interaction effect of
R&D spending and being a lead firm (or component supplier), respectively.
Model for main effect:
PERFit = β0 + β1VCPit + β2R&Dit + β3TAit + β4INDUSTRYit + β5YEARit + ε.
Model for interaction effect:
PERFit = β0 + β1VCP ∗ R&Dit + β2TAit + β3INDUSTRYit + β4YEARit + ε,
where for firm i in year t:
PERFit = Gross Margin, Net Margin, ROA and ROE
VCPit = A dummy for lead firm (or component supplier)
R&Dit = R&D ratio (R&D expense/sales)
TAit = Ln(total assets)
VCP∗R&Dit = Interaction term of lead firm (or component supplier) and R&D ratio
INDUSTRYit = A dummy for industry
YEARit = A dummy for year
ε = An error term
The PERF stands for firm performance; its measure will be replaced in turn by gross
margin, net margin, ROA and ROE. The value chain position (VCP) is a dummy variable
representing value chain position, which will be replaced in turn by the dummy variable
of lead firm and component supplier. The dummy variable of lead firm indicates whether
the firm is lead firm or CM/ODM. The dummy variable of component supplier indicates
whether the firm is component supplier or CM/ODM. The TA (total assets) is used as a
control variable for firm size.1 We take the log of TA in order to get a normal distribution
for the value. To control for industry- and year-specific effects, dummy variables for each
industry and year are included. The interaction term of lead firm (or component supplier)
and R&D is included in order to examine if there is an interaction effect of R&D spending
and being a lead firm (or a component supplier) for firm performance. A positive sign may
suggest that lead firms (or component suppliers) capture more profits from R&D spending.
3.2. Data sources and coding
This research employs two data sources: the Taiwanese Stock Exchange database and
the Hoovers database for the eight years from 2002 to 2009. We obtain financial data,
such as sales, gross profit, ROA and ROE, from the Taiwanese Stock Exchange and other
data, such as R&D expense and selling and general administration (S&GA) expense from
Hoovers. The data are collected for all the firms listed in the Taiwanese Stock Exchange
for the following seven electronics industries: communications and Internet (CI), computer
and peripheral equipment (CPE), electronic parts/components (EPC), electronic products
distribution (EPD), optoelectronic (OPT), semiconductor (SEMI) and other electronic.2
We employ grossmargin as ameasure of value capture.Value capture can be indicated by
gross profit (the numerator of gross margin) since it estimates the value a company captures
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from its role in the value chain, which it can use to reward shareholders (dividends), invest
in future growth (R&D), cover the cost of capital depreciation and pay its overhead expenses
(marketing and administration) (Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick 2009). Net margin, ROA
and ROE are also employed to measure a company’s bottom-line financial performance.
The sample includes 1585 observations for the eight years from 2002 to 2009 for a total
of 209 firms (20 lead firms, 28 CMs/ODMs and 161 component suppliers). The sample
statistics are shown in Table 1.
4. Results
4.1. Value capture
As shown in Table 2, lead firms and component suppliers capture greater value in terms
of gross margins, while CMs have higher ROE. Net margins are also higher for lead firms
and component suppliers than for CMs/ODMs, but while the difference is statistically
significant, it is very small. The reason might be that lead firms and component suppliers
spend heavily on sales and marketing; our results show that lead firms and component
suppliers spend more on S&GA expense. CMs might get higher ROE from debt financing;
they have higher debt ratio than lead firms and component suppliers. It is notable, however,
that ROE of the three types of firms are all positive. This implies that generous government
policies on debt financing might affect Taiwanese electronics firms’ ROE, particularly that
of CMs. We do not detect any significant differences in ROA for the three types of firms.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the means of gross and net margins of lead firms, component
suppliers and CMs/ODMs. The mean plot for gross margin shows the pattern of value
Table 2. ANOVA, non-parametric χ 2 (Kruskal-Wallis) and median test results (2002–2009).
N Mean F χ 2
Median
test (χ 2)
Gross margin Lead firms 150 19.71% 20.488
∗∗∗
71.959
∗∗∗
69.057
∗∗∗
CMs/ODMs 215 13.36%
Co-suppliers 1220 20.15%
Net margin Lead firms 150 7.04% 1.112 37.367
∗∗∗
63.773
∗∗∗
CMs/ODMs 215 5.77%
Co-suppliers 1220 8.79%
Return on assets Lead firms 154 7.26% .344 .704 1.231
CMs/ODMs 209 7.92%
Cosuppliers 1146 8.01%
Return on equity Lead firms 154 8.71% 2.333
∗
4.002 7.305
∗∗
CMs/ODMs 210 12.92%
Co-suppliers 1148 10.81%
Debt ratio
(Liabilities/Assets)
Lead firms 154 36.94% 29.714
∗∗∗
61.743
∗∗∗
41.215
∗∗∗
CMs/ODMs 210 42.43%
Co-suppliers 1149 33.96%
S&GA expense/sales Lead firms 144 12.43% 35.80
∗∗∗
110.76
∗∗∗
63.24
∗∗∗
CMs/ODMs 212 6.49%
Co-suppliers 1151 9.74%
R&D expense/sales Lead firms 143 4.32% 5.310
∗∗∗
14.834
∗∗∗
24.857
∗∗∗
CMs/ODMs 210 3.46%
Co-suppliers 1066 4.69%
∗∗∗
p < 0.01;
∗∗
p < 9.05;
∗
p < 0.10.
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Figure 1. Mean plot for gross margin.
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capture for the three types of firms in the Taiwanese electronics industry. Both lead firms
and component suppliers earn average gross margins of about 20%, compared to 13% for
CM/ODMs. The mean plot for net margin shows a similar pattern, but the difference for
the three types of firms is smaller as mentioned earlier.
Figures 3 and 4 show the mean plots for ROA and ROE. The shape of the mean plot for
ROE looks the reverse compared to the mean plot for gross margin. As discussed earlier,
higher levels of debt financing might mean that returns are measured against a lower equity
base for CM/ODMs and thus their ROE is relatively higher.
4.2. R&D impact on value capture
The R&D impact on value capture by the three types of firms (lead firms, component
suppliers and CMs/ODMs) is analyzed by 2SLS regression. Since our data-set includes
repeated observations of the same firm, we cannot assume independence of errors within
firms. To address this issue, we conduct the 2SLS estimation with the errors clustered within
firms. This approach includes the Huber–White adjustment to control for heteroskedasticity
(Kleis et al., 2012). We use one-year lagged R&D, CR4 and industry average R&D ratio
as instrument variables for R&D in order to address the issue of reverse causality between
R&D and firm performance. Lagged R&D has been identified in previous research as a
useful instrument (Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen 1999; Kleis et al., 2012). Industry
factors such as CR43 and industry average R&D ratio are related to a firm’s R&D invest-
ment decision but not necessarily to the variance of firm performance. We also validate
our instrument variables by using the Sagan’s and Basmann’s chi-square statistics. These
statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid and not correlated
with the error term. Significant test statistics indicate that the instruments may not be valid.
The statistics are reported, along with regression results, in Tables 3–6.
As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the results for main effect (model 1) show that lead firms
do not perform better than CMs/ODMs, other things being equal, while R&D is strongly
associated with an increase in gross profits for both lead firms and CMs/ODMs. However,
the interaction term (model 2) indicates that lead firms earn higher gross profits from their
R&D spending, compared to CMs/ODMs. The difference in R&D impact on bottom-line
financial performance as measured by net margin, ROA and ROE is minimal. These results
suggest that by leveraging their R&D activity on product-level innovation through branding,
marketing and customer knowledge, lead firms capture higher gross profits from their R&D
spending, compared to CMs/ODMs. However, such benefits are negated by the size of their
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R&D spending and marketing, so lead firms’ return to R&D is not significantly different
from CMs/ODMs.
Similarly, component suppliers do not perform better than CMs/ODMs, other things be-
ing equal (Tables 5 and 6), while R&D is strongly associatedwith an increase in gross profits
for both component suppliers and CMs/ODMs. However, the interaction term (model 2)
indicates that component suppliers earn higher gross profits from their R&D spending, com-
pared to CMs/ODMs. The difference in R&D impact on bottom-line financial performance
as measured by net margin and ROA is minimal. However, the impact of R&D on ROE is
negative and such negative impact is greater for component suppliers than for CMs/ODMs.
These results suggest that component suppliers capture higher gross profits from their R&D
spending, compared to CMs/ODMs, by focusing on component-level innovation. However,
component suppliers’ returns to R&D as measured by ROE are lower than CMs/ODMs due
to the size of their R&D spending.
5. Discussion and conclusions
As expected, our results show that lead firms have higher gross margins than CMs/ODMs
(Figure 1). However, they have low net margins, probably due to R&D, sales and marketing
costs. In contrast, component suppliers capture higher profits (netmargins), even accounting
for R&D costs (Figure 2). However, their returns on investment are not as great as CMs
(Figure 4). This suggests that Taiwanese component suppliers are unable to gain pricing
power from their R&D investments, perhaps because some firms focus on commodity
components such as memory chips and displays rather than more proprietary components
such as microprocessors or application specific integrated circuits, and some firms focus
on component manufacturing services. Assemblers (CMs/ODMs) have thin margins, but
earn reasonable returns due to scale and efficient use of resources.
Our results imply that the economic performance of firms depends not only on the
returns from their strategies, but also on the cost of implementing those strategies (Barney
1986; Peteraf 1993). According to Peteraf (1993), without imperfections in strategic factor
markets, where the resources necessary to implement strategies are acquired, firms can only
hope for normal returns. Rumelt (1987) also argues that unless there is a difference between
the ex post value of a venture and the ex ante cost of acquiring the necessary resources, the
entrepreneurial rents are zero.
The R&D impact on value capture in terms of ROE shows a mixed picture. Among the
three types of firms, Taiwanese CMs/ODMs have competitive advantage in terms of ROE
over component suppliers in the industry. Differences may be due to different financial
structure, e.g. degree of debt leverage across sectors.
This research makes several contributions to knowledge about global production net-
works. First, it uses previous theoretical work on who captures the value in global value
chains and produces empirical results consistent with these theories (Barney 1986; Peteraf
1993; Teece 2007), thereby providing indirect support. Second, whereas previous empirical
research focused on global electronics firms ranked by the Electronics Business 300 (Shin,
Kraemer, and Dedrick 2012), this research focuses on electronics firms in a single country,
Taiwan. Like the earlier research, it shows that business practices and industry segment
characteristics, such as R&D activity coupled with branding, marketing and positioning
close to the consumer markets, can have a profound impact on the economic performance
of the three types of firms. Third, despite this similarity, there are several differences.
The practice of high leverage affects significantly Taiwanese electronics companies’ ROE,
particularly that of CMs. Compared to the previous research, showing that all three types
of firms in the global electronics industry have negative ROE, Taiwanese firms’ ROE is
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positive and high. The Taiwan government’s policy on debt financing helps these electronics
firms gain high ROE. This research also employs a different methodology (2SLS) to analyze
the interaction of R&D with value chain position as an indicator of R&D performance,
which was not done in previous research.
Our findings suggest that lead firms need to create barriers to entry to sustain higher
gross margins. This can be done by continuing product-level innovation, improving cus-
tomer knowledge and improving their sales and marketing activities. Component suppliers
may be at risk if margins come under pressure. Thus, they also need to create entry barriers
probably through improving their innovation activities, changing their focus from commod-
ity components to high-value components, or developing more intellectual property that
can be used as a competitive weapon. Assemblers might vertically integrate or diversify to
increase margins, but face entry barriers in either case. For example, Foxconn diversified
its product lines, including PCs and mobile phones. HTC has made a transition from CM to
brand name business. However, such moves are not easy to make for most other firms and
are risky. HTC’s recent decline in revenues (Garside and Arthur 2012) shows the difficulty
in sustaining a brand name business (similar to the struggles of former mobile leaders
Nokia and Research in Motion).
This research also raises an important issue for policy-makers. If the goal is to promote
high margin businesses, countries must invest heavily in R&D and/or marketing, employing
high-paid scientists, engineers andmarketing people. However, if the goal is to increase total
employment, then the labor-intensive middle of the value chain has the greatest potential for
job creation. Thus, for policy-makers, the issue is a matter of country goals – high paying
jobs and high margin companies or large numbers of low paying jobs. This is especially
important for an economy such as Taiwan that can no longer compete based on low wages
at home, but has not yet caught up the developed world in R&D, marketing and branding.
It is the cooperation between mainland China and Taiwan that enables Taiwan to be price-
competitive, while also developing capabilities for R&D, product development, marketing
and developing own-brand companies.
Notes
1. The number of employee could not be employed for a measure of firm size because the data
was available only for a few firms in the sample; its use reduces the number of observations
significantly for the analysis.
2. The sample does not include firms in the information service industry.
3. Four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) is a measure of market concentration. It measures the total
market share of the four largest firms in an industry. Firms in concentrated industries tend to
invest more in R&D because concentration reduces market uncertainty and provides cash flow
for R&D (Roucan-Kane, Ubilava, and Xu 2007). On the other hand, reduced competition due to
industry concentration can lead to reduced R&D (Schimmelpfennig, Pray, and Brennan 2004).
In either case, concentration is not necessarily related to the variance of firm performance.
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